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Abstract—A divide-and-conquer cryptanalysis can often be
mounted against some keystream generators composed of several
(nonlinear) independent devices combined by a Boolean function.
In particular, any parity-check relation derived from the periods
of some constituent sequences usually leads to a distinguishing
attack whose complexity is determined by the bias of the relation.
However, estimating this bias is a difficult problem since the
piling-up lemma cannot be used. Here, we give two exact
expressions for this bias. Most notably, these expressions lead to a
new algorithm for computing the bias of a parity-check relation,
and they also provide some simple formulae for this bias in some
particular cases which are commonly used in cryptography.
I. DIVIDE-AND-CONQUER ATTACKS AGAINST SOME
STREAM CIPHERS
Parity-check relations are extensively used in cryptanalysis
for building statistical distinguishers. For instance, they can be
exploited in divide-and-conquer attacks against some stream
ciphers which consist of several independent devices whose
output sequences are combined by a nonlinear function. Here,
we focus on such keystream generators as depicted on Fig-
ure 1. All the n constituent devices are updated independently
from each other. The only assumption which will be used
in the whole paper is that each sequence xi = (xi(t))t≥0
generated by the i-th device is periodic with least period Ti.
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Fig. 1. Keystream generator composed of several independent devices
combined by a Boolean function
The simplest case of a generator built according to the
model depicted in Figure 1 is the combination generator, where
all devices are LFSRs. However, our work is of greater interest
in the case where the next-state functions of the constituent
devices are nonlinear. The eSTREAM candidate Achterbahn
and its variants [1], [2], designed by Gammel, Göttfert and
Kniffler, follow this design principle: all these ciphers are
actually composed of several nonlinear feedback shift registers
(NLFSRs) with maximal periods. This design is very attractive
since the use of independent devices enables to accommodate
a large internal state with a small hardware footprint.
However, the main weakness of this design is obviously
that it is inherently vulnerable to divide-and-conquer attacks.
As originally pointed out by Siegenthaler [3], the cryptanalyst
may actually mount an attack which depends on a small
subset of the constituent devices only. This can be done if
there exists a smaller generator which involves k constituent
devices whose output is correlated to the keystream. This
equivalently means that there exists a correlation between the
output of the combining function and the output of a Boolean
function depending on k variables. The smallest number k of
devices that have to be considered together in the attack is then
equal to (t+1) where t is the correlation-immunity order (or
resiliency order) of the combining function f . Recall that a
Boolean function is said to be t-th order correlation-immune
if its output distribution does not change when any t input
variables are fixed. Moreover, a t-resilient function is a t-th
order correlation-immune function which is balanced.
Now, we recall how parity-check relations can be used
for mounting a divide-and-conquer attack against such a
keystream generator. This technique has been introduced by
Johansson, Meier and Muller [4] for cryptanalysing the first
version of Achterbahn [1]. Then, it has been extensively
exploited in several attacks against the following variants of
the cipher [5], [6], [7], [8]. By analogy with coding theory, a
parity-check relation for a binary sequence x = (x(t))t≥0 is
a linear relation between some bits of x at different instants
(t+ τ) where τ varies in a fixed set and t takes any value:⊕
τ∈T
x(t + τ) = 0, ∀t ≥ 0.
Then, the indexes τ corresponding to the nonzero coefficients
of the characteristic polynomial of a linear recurring sequence
provide a parity-check relation. A two-term parity-check rela-
tion,
x(t) ⊕ x(t+ τ) = 0, ∀t ≥ 0,
obviously corresponds to a period of the sequence. In the
following, we only focus on parity-check relations between
2s instants which are defined as follows.
Definition 1: Let x1, . . . ,xn be n sequences and let f be
a Boolean function of n variables. Then, for any set
T =
{ s∑
i=1
ciMi, ci ∈ {0, 1}
}
where M1, . . . ,Ms are some non-negative integers, PCf,T is
the binary sequence defined by
PCf,T (t) =
⊕
τ∈T
f(x1(t+ τ), . . . , xn(t+ τ)), ∀t ≥ 0.
In the following, each Mi corresponds to a multiple of
the least common multiple of the periods of some constituent
sequences. Moreover, in order to simplify the notation, we will
assume without loss of generality that the input variables are
ordered in such a way that each integer Mi corresponds to a
multiple of lcm(Tℓi+1, . . . , Tℓi+1) with ℓ1 = 0 and ℓs+1 = k.
This notably implies that T involves the periods of the first
k sequences, x1 . . . , xk .
Proposition 2: Let x1, . . . ,xn be n sequences with least
periods T1, . . . , Tn and
T =
{ s∑
i=1
ciMi, ci ∈ {0, 1}
}
where Mi = qilcm(Tℓi+1, . . . , Tℓi+1) with qi > 0 and ℓ1 = 0
and ℓs+1 = k. Let g be any Boolean function of k variables
of the form
g(x1, . . . , xk) =
s∑
i=1
gi(xℓi+1, . . . , xℓi+1)
where each gi is any Boolean function of (ℓi+1−ℓi) variables.
Then, for all t ≥ 0, we have
PCg,T (t) =
⊕
τ∈T
g(x1(t+ τ), . . . , xn(t+ τ)) = 0.
In the whole paper, we use the following notation.
Definition 3: Let f be a Boolean function of n variables.
Then, the bias of f is
E(f) = 2−n
∑
x∈Fn
2
(−1)f(x).
This quantity is also called the imbalance of f (e.g. in [9],
[10]) or the correlation between f and the all-zero function
(e.g. in [11]).
The underlying principle of the attack presented by Jo-
hansson, Meier and Muller [4] consists in exhibiting a biased
approximation g of the combining function f which involves
k input variables, and a parity-check relation PCg,T = 0 for
the sequence g(x1, . . . ,xk). Then, the associated parity-check
relation applied to f(x1, . . . ,xn) does not vanish but it is
biased in the sense that it is not uniformly distributed when the
(T1+ . . .+Tn) bits x1(0), . . . , x1(T1−1), x2(0), . . . , x2(T2−
1), . . . , xn(Tn− 1) are randomly chosen. The bias of PCf,T ,
denoted by E(PCf,T ) is then defined as the bias of a Boolean
function with (T1 + . . . + Tn) input variables corresponding
to the concatenation of the first periods of the sequences. It
follows that
Pr[PCf,T (t) = 0] =
1
2
(1 + E(PCf,T ))
with E(PCf,T ) > 0. Then, computing
PCf,T (t) =
⊕
τ∈T
s(t+ τ)
where s is the keystream for different values of t ≥ 0 enables
the attacker to distinguish the keystream from a random
sequence. The complexity of this distinguishing attack depends
on the bias ε of PCf,T . More precisely, the time complexity
of the attack corresponds to ε−22s where 2s is the number of
elements in T since the bias ε can be detected from at least
ε−2 occurrences of the biased relation. The data complexity,
i.e. the number of consecutive keystream bits required for the
attack is then the maximal value which must be considered
for (t+ τ), i.e.
ε−2 +maxT .
Many variants of this attack can be derived [5], [6], [7],
[8]. However, determining the complexity of all these attacks
requires an estimation of the bias of PCf,T . In several at-
tacks [4], [5], [2], it was assumed that the piling-up lemma [12]
holds, i.e.
E(PCf,T ) = [E(f ⊕ g)]
2s
.
But it clearly appears that this result does not apply since the
terms f(x1(t + τ), . . . , xn(t + τ)) for the different values of
τ ∈ T are not independent. Actually, Naya-Plasencia [6] and
Hell and Johansson [7] have independently pointed out that
the so-called piling-up approximation [10] is far from being
valid in some cases.
For instance, the 11-variable Boolean function used in
Achterbahn-80 is 6-resilient. An exhaustive search for the
initial states of x1 and x2 and a decimation by T7 enable the
attacker to use parity-check relations for f ′ = f+x1+x2+x7,
which is 3-resilient. Then, the quadratic approximation
g = x3x10 + x4x9 with E(f ′ ⊕ g) = 2−5
has been considered, corresponding to the set
T = {c1T3T10 + c2T4T9, c1, c2 ∈ {0, 1}}.
It has been deduced that the bias of PCf ′,T was (2−5)4 =
2−20, leading to an infeasible attack which exceeds the
keystream length limitation [2]: the data complexity must be
at least 240 and must be multiplied by T7 = 228. But, Naya-
Plasencia in [6] used another approximation, namely
g = x3 + x10 + x4 + x9 with E(f ′ ⊕ g) = 2−3.
This linear approximation leads to E(PCf,T ) = 2−12 for the
same set T , and to a feasible attack with an overall data
complexity close to 252 (see [6] for a precise estimation of
the complexity).
From this concrete example, it clearly appears that esti-
mating the bias of PCf,T may be a difficult problem. This
issue has been raised in [6], [13] which have identified some
cases where the piling-up approximation holds. However, since
these equality cases are quite rare, a much more extensive
study is needed in order to evaluate the resistance of such
keystream generators to distinguishing attacks. In this paper,
we first emphasize that, even if most attacks based on parity-
check relations use an explicit correspondence between the
set T and an approximation g of f depending on k variables,
the bias of PCf,T does not depend on this approximation.
Most notably, we show in the next section that the piling-
up lemma applied to any approximation g compatible with T
provides a lower bound on E(PCf,T ). Then, Section III gives
two exact expressions for E(PCf,T ), one involving the biases
of some restrictions of f , and the other one by means of its
Walsh coefficients. These expressions lead to an algorithm for
computing the bias of a parity-check relation with a much
lower complexity than the usual approach, and they also
provide some simple formulae for this bias in some particular
cases which are commonly used in cryptography, especially
when f is a plateaued function.
II. A LOWER BOUND ON THE BIAS OF PARITY-CHECK
RELATIONS
However, we can prove that the piling-up approximation
provides a lower bound on the bias of PCf,T .
Theorem 4: Let x1, . . . ,xn be n sequences with least pe-
riods T1, . . . , Tn, f a Boolean function of n variables and
s = f(x1, . . . ,xn). Let
T = {
s∑
i=1
ciMi, ci ∈ {0, 1}}
where Mi = qilcm(Tℓi+1, . . . , Tℓi+1) with qi > 0, ℓ1 = 0 and
ℓs+1 = k. Then, for any Boolean function g of k variables of
the form
g(x1, . . . , xk) =
s∑
i=1
gi(xℓi+1, . . . , xℓi+1) (1)
where each gi is a Boolean function of (ℓi+1 − ℓi) variables,
we have
E(PCf,T ) ≥ [E(f ⊕ g)]
2s
.
The keypoint in the previous theorem is that E(f ⊕ g)
provides a lower bound on the bias on the parity-check relation
for any choice of the approximation g of the form (1). The
linear approximation of f by the sum of the first k input
variables is usually considered, but any linear approximation
involving these variables can be chosen, as stated in the next
corollary. In the following, for any α ∈ Fn2 , ϕα denotes the
linear function of n variables: x 7→ α · x, where x · y is the
usual scalar product.
Corollary 5: With the notation of Theorem 4, we have
E(PCf,T ) ≥ max
α∈Vk
[E(f ⊕ ϕα)]
2s
where Vk is the subspace spanned by the first k basis vectors.
It is worth noticing that this corollary leads to a lower bound
on the bias of the parity check relation even if the functions
f and x 7→ x1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ xk are not correlated (i.e., if the
Walsh coefficient of f at point 1k vanishes, where the first
k coordinates of 1k are 1 and the other (n−k) are zero). This
is the first known result in such a situation; the impossibility
of deducing any estimation of the bias of the relation in such
cases has been stressed in Example 1 in [13].
However, some other approximations g with a higher degree
may lead to a better bound. But, since any Boolean function
is completely determined by its Walsh transform, i.e. by
the biases of all its linear approximations, it appears that
E(PCf,T ) can be computed from the biases of the linear
approximations of f only.
III. EXACT FORMULAE FOR THE BIAS OF THE
PARITY-CHECK RELATION
In some situations, especially when the designer of a gen-
erator has to guarantee that the system resists distinguishing
attacks, the previous lower bound on the bias of a parity-
check relation is not sufficient, and its exact value must
be computed. However, since a parity-check relation with
2s terms involves n2s variables where n is the number of
variables of f , computing its bias requires 2n2s evaluations
of f , which is out of reach in many practical situations.
For instance, Achterbahn-128 uses a combining function f
of 13 variables, and the biases of parity-check relations with
8 terms (i.e. with s = 3) must be estimated; this requires
2104 operations. Here, we give two exact expressions of the
bias of a parity-check relation, which can be computed with
much fewer operations, e.g. with 243 evaluations of f in the
previous case. The first expression makes use of the biases
of the restrictions of f when its first k inputs are fixed; the
second one, which is related to a theorem due to Nyberg [11],
is based on the Walsh coefficients of the combining function.
A similar technique is also used in another context in [14].
A. Expression by means of the restrictions of f
Definition 6: Let f be a Boolean function of n variables and
let Vk and Vn−k be two subspaces such that Vk×Vn−k = Fn2
and dim(Vk) = k. Then, the restriction of f to the affine
subspace a + Vn−k, a ∈ Vk , denoted by fa+Vn−k , is the
Boolean function of (n− k) variables defined by
fa+Vn−k : x ∈ Vn−k 7→ f(x+ a).
Now, for computing the exact value of E(PCf,T ), we de-
compose PCf,T according to the values of the first k variables
in f since the other (n− k) sequences xi, k+1 ≤ i ≤ n, are
supposed to be such that xi(t+ τ) is statistically independent
from xi(t) for any τ ∈ T . Amongst the k2s variables xi(t+τ),
1 ≤ i ≤ k and τ ∈ T , we can easily see that each variable is
repeated once. Indeed, for j such that ℓi < j ≤ ℓi+1 we have
xj(t+ τ) = xj(t+ τ
′) if and only if |τ − τ ′| = Mi.
It follows that the values of xj(t+τ), 1 ≤ j ≤ k and τ ∈ T
are determined by a k2s−1-bit word α. Let us split α into k
words (α1, . . . , αk) of 2s−1 bits. We use the correspondence
between the values of τ =
∑s
i=1 ciMi in T and the integers
c, 0 ≤ c ≤ 2s − 1 defined by c =
∑s
i=1 ci2
i−1
. Then, the
value of the k-bit word (x1(t+ τ), . . . , xk(t+ τ)) is equal to
χ(c, α) = (χ1(c, α), . . . , χk(c, α)) where, for any j such that
ℓi < j ≤ ℓi+1, we have
χj(c, α) =
{
χj(c− 2
i, α) if ci 6= 0
αj,2iq+r if c = 2i+1q + r, r < 2i.
Clearly, if ci 6= 0, we have that c and c′ = c− 2i correspond
to a pair (τ, τ ′) with τ − τ ′ = Mi. Since Mi is a period of
xj , we deduce that χj(c, α) = χj(c′, α).
If ci = 0, the corresponding value of xj(t+τ) is statistically
independent from the previous ones and must be defined by a
bit of α which has not been used for smaller values of c. The
number of bits of αj which has been used for previous vectors
χj(c
′, α) for c′ < 2i+1q is 2iq since the set {0, . . . , 2i+1q−1}
is composed of 2iq pairs of the form (c′, c′+2i) with c′i = 0.
Moreover, all c′ in {2i+1q, . . . , 2i+1q + r − 1} satisfy c′i = 0
because r < 2i. Therefore, exactly (2iq + r − 1) bits of αj
have been used for χj(c′, α), c′ < 2i+1q + r.
Example. Let us consider a set T composed of 23 elements
which involve the periods of 4 sequences:
T =
{
c1T1T2 + c2T3 + c3T4, c1, c2, c3 ∈ {0.1}
}
.
Then, the 4-bit words χ(c, α), 0 ≤ c < 8, are defined by the
16-bit word α as follows, where the bold elements correspond
to those which have already been used for a smaller value of c:
χ(0, α) = (α00α10α20α30) χ(4, α) = (α02α12α22α30)
χ(1, α) = (α00α10α21α31) χ(5, α) = (α02α12α23α31)
χ(2, α) = (α01α11α20α32) χ(6, α) = (α03α13α22α32)
χ(3, α) = (α01α11α21a33) χ(7, α) = (α03α13α23α33)
The definition of χ(c, α) enables us to express the bias of
PCf,T by means of the biases of the restrictions of f to all
cosets of the subspace Vn−k spanned by the last (n−k) basis
vectors.
Theorem 7: Let x1, . . . ,xn be n sequences with least pe-
riods T1, . . . , Tn, f a Boolean function of n variables and
s = f(x1, . . . ,xn). Let
T = {
s∑
i=1
ciMi, ci ∈ {0, 1}}
where Mi = qilcm(Tℓi+1, . . . , Tℓi+1) with qi > 0, ℓ1 = 0 and
ℓs+1 = k. Assume that T does not contain any multiple of
Tj , for any k < j ≤ n. Let Vn−k be the subspace spanned by
the last (n− k) basis vectors. Then, we have
E(PCf,T ) =
1
2k2s−1
∑
α∈Fk2
s−1
2
2s−1∏
c=0
E(fχ(c,α)+Vn−k).
Proof:
Pr[PCf,T (t) = 0] =
1
2k2s−1
∑
α∈Fk2
s−1
2
Pr[PCf,T (t) = 0|
(x1(t+ τ), . . . , xk(t+ τ)) = χ(c, α)].
When the values of the first k input variables in every term
of PCf,T are fixed, the piling-up lemma can be applied since
the remaining (n−k)2s variables are statistically independent.
The reason is that τ is not a multiple of the period Ti, for any
k < i ≤ n. Then, we deduce that the term corresponding to α
in the previous sum equals
1
2
[
1 +
∏
τ∈T
E(f(x(t + τ), y(t+ τ))|x(t + τ) = χ(c, α))
]
=
1
2
[
1 +
2s−1∏
c=0
E(fχ(c,α)+Vn−k)
]
.
We then deduce that
Pr[PCf,T (t) = 0] =
1
2

1+ 1
2k2s−1
∑
α∈Fk2
s−1
2
2s−1∏
c=0
E(fχ(c,α)+Vn−k)

 .
This result provides an algorithm for computing the exact
value of E(PCf,T ). The precomputation step consists in com-
puting and storing in a table the 2k values of E(fa+Vn−k) =
1
2k
∑
y∈V n−k(−1)
f(a+y)
, for all a ∈ Vk. This step requires 2n
evaluations of f . Then, computing the bias of the parity-check
relation needs to compute, for all α ∈ Fk2s−12 , the product of
2s precomputed values whose indexes are given by χ(c, α), for
0 ≤ c < 2s. This requires 2k2s−1×2s operations over integers.
This leads to an overall complexity of 2k2s−1+s + 2n which
is much lower than the complexity of the trivial computation,
2n2
s
evaluations of f . For instance, the 13-variable function in
Achterbahn-128 is 8-resilient. Estimating the bias of a parity-
check relation involving 10 input variables with 8 terms (i.e.
with s = 3) then requires 243 operations.
B. Expression by means of the Walsh coefficients of f
A similar exact expression for the bias of E(PCf,T ) can be
obtained from the Walsh coefficients of f , i.e. from all biases
E(f + ϕa), a ∈ Vk where Vk is the subspace spanned by the
first k basis vectors.
Theorem 8: Let x1, . . . ,xn be n sequences with least pe-
riods T1, . . . , Tn, f a Boolean function of n variables and
s = f(x1, . . . ,xn). Let
T =
{ s∑
i=1
ciMi, ci ∈ {0, 1}
}
where Mi = qilcm(Tℓi+1, . . . , Tℓi+1) with qi > 0, ℓ1 = 0 and
ℓs+1 = k. Assume that T does not contain any multiple of
Tj , for any k < j ≤ n. Then, we have
E(PCf,T ) =
∑
α∈Fk2
s−1
2
2s−1∏
c=0
E(f + ϕχ(c,α)).
This expression leads to an algorithm for computing the bias
which is very similar to the one based on the biases of the
restrictions of f . But, we need to precompute and to store the
Walsh coefficients of f corresponding to all elements in Vk .
IV. COMPUTING THE BIAS IN SOME PARTICULAR CASES
As a direct corollary of Theorem 8, we obtain the following
theorem. It shows that equality holds in Corollary 5 when,
amongst all linear functions depending on the k variables
involved in T , a single one corresponds to a biased approxi-
mation of f . With this theorem, we recover the value of the
bias of a parity-check relation involving the periods of k input
sequences when the resiliency order of f is equal to (k − 1).
This particular case of our theorem corresponds to the case
identified in [6], [13] where the piling-up approximation holds.
Theorem 9: With the notation of Theorem 8, suppose that
there exists a single linear function ϕa with a ∈ Vk such that
E(f + ϕa) 6= 0. Then, we have
E(PCf,T ) = [E(f + ϕa)]
2s
.
In particular, if f is (k − 1)-resilient, then
E(PCf,T ) = [E(f + ϕ1k)]
2s
.
where 1k is the n-bit word whose first k coordinates are equal
to 1 and the other ones are equal to 0.
For a t-resilient function, the bias of a parity-check relation
involving any (t + 1) inputs is given by Theorem 9 but, as
pointed out in [13], this result does not hold anymore when T
involves (t+ 2) sequences. However, this case can be treated
when the function f is plateaued [15], i.e. when all values
taken by its Walsh transform belong to {0,±W} for some
W . Note that both combining functions in Achterbahn-80 and
in Achterbahn-128 are plateaued.
Theorem 10: With the notation and hypotheses of Theo-
rem 8, suppose that f is (k − 2)-resilient and plateaued, i.e.
E(f + ϕa) ∈ {0,±ε} for all a ∈ Fn2 . Let
A = {a ∈ Vk, E(f + ϕa) 6= 0}.
Then,
E(PCf,T ) ≤ |A|
2s−1ε2
s
.
Moreover, equality holds if and only if there exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤
s, such that Mi is a period of all sequences xj for all j in
∪a∈Asupp(1k ⊕ a).
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